Security · TLS
TLS cipher suite checker.
Paste cipher suite names (OpenSSL or IANA) or hex codes, from openssl ciphers, a server config or a packet capture, and get each suite’s IANA registry entry: value, DTLS-OK, Recommended and reference RFC. Suites that are TLS 1.3-only, CBC, RC4, 3DES, NULL, EXPORT or anonymous are flagged by name. Everything runs in your browser; nothing is sent and no server is contacted.
Cipher suites
Registry lookup
Paste cipher suites and press Check suites.
Worked example
Pasting ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 resolves to IANA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, value 0xC0,0x2F, DTLS-OK Y, Recommended Y, reference RFC 5289. Pasting AES128-SHA resolves to TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 0x00,0x2F, Recommended D (discouraged), and is flagged for CBC mode, a SHA-1 MAC and static RSA key exchange (no forward secrecy). Use “Load example” to see a mixed list.
How the flags are decided
Flags come only from the underscore-separated tokens of the IANA suite name, so they are a reading of the name, not a test of anything. TLS 1.3 style: the name has no _WITH_ part (for example TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384); IANA notes these cannot be used for TLS 1.2 or lower and the reverse. NULL, EXPORT, anon, RC4, 3DES, single DES, RC2, IDEA and MD5 are marked weak. CBC, a trailing SHA (HMAC-SHA1) and static key exchange (TLS_RSA_WITH_, or static DH/ECDH) are marked legacy. DHE/ECDHE and TLS 1.3 names get a forward-secrecy note. Reserved GREASE values (RFC 8701) and the SCSV signalling values are labelled as such. Entries IANA lists as Unassigned or Reserved for Private Use are not in the snapshot and show as not matched.
Reading the IANA columns
DTLS-OK says whether the suite is usable with DTLS. Recommended is Y, N or D. Per the registry notes, N “does not necessarily mean” flawed: the suite may not have gone through the IETF consensus process, may have limited applicability, or may be for specific use cases. D means discouraged: it SHOULD NOT or MUST NOT be used, depending on the situation, so check the referenced RFC. CCM_8 suites are intentionally not marked Recommended. The registry itself warns that cryptographic algorithms and parameters weaken over time and that implementers should not blindly implement listed suites.
Sources: IANA, TLS Cipher Suites registry (CSV tls-parameters-4.csv; registry last updated 2026-09-18; snapshot fetched 2026-10-01); RFC 8701 (GREASE); RFC 7465 (prohibiting RC4); OpenSSL ciphers manual.
How to read a cipher suite name
A TLS cipher suite name packs several decisions into one string. Take the IANA name TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 from the worked example above and split it at _WITH_:
- ECDHE is the key exchange: ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman, which generates a fresh key for every connection and so gives forward secrecy.
- RSA is how the server proves who it is: its certificate carries an RSA key used to sign the handshake.
- AES_128_GCM is the bulk cipher that protects the data: AES with a 128-bit key in Galois/Counter Mode, an authenticated mode.
- SHA256 is the hash used for the handshake's key derivation (the pseudorandom function). It is not an integrity hash over each record, because GCM already authenticates the data.
The OpenSSL name for the same suite is ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256. The two names describe one thing and are matched through the same two-byte value, 0xC0,0x2F.
TLS 1.3 suites look different
TLS 1.3 separated key exchange and authentication from the suite, so a TLS 1.3 name has no key-exchange or _WITH_ part: it names only the AEAD cipher and the hash. RFC 8446 defined five, and the current TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 9846, keeps them: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x13,0x01), TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x13,0x02), TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x13,0x03), TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 (0x13,0x04) and TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 (0x13,0x05). The specification requires a compliant application to implement TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. Those names cannot be used with TLS 1.2, and TLS 1.2 names cannot be used with TLS 1.3, which is why a server can offer both families side by side.
What the current guidance asks of a server
RFC 9325, the IETF's best-current-practice document for TLS and DTLS, says implementations must not negotiate TLS 1.0 or 1.1 and must support TLS 1.2. For TLS 1.2 it recommends four suites, all ECDHE with AES-GCM: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. It says implementations should not negotiate suites based on RSA key transport ("static RSA", names starting TLS_RSA_WITH_), mainly because they do not support forward secrecy. That is the reason the checker flags static key exchange and CBC suites as legacy. These documents are guidance, and they can be updated, so check the current versions. The checker reads names only; it does not test your server.
A practical checking routine
- Get the list your server offers from a scanner you control (OpenSSL's
s_clientor a TLS scanner) or from your server configuration. - Paste the list here, in OpenSSL or IANA form, one per line or separated by commas.
- Look first for anything flagged weak (NULL, EXPORT, anon, RC4, 3DES, DES, RC2, IDEA, MD5). These should not be enabled at all.
- Then review the legacy flags: CBC modes, SHA-1 MACs and static key exchange. Remove them unless you must support old clients.
- Check the order and the protocol versions in your server software, because the suite list alone does not control those.
Common mix-ups
-
Often assumedA TLS 1.3 suite name such as TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 should name the key exchange like older suites do.
What the source saysIn TLS 1.3 a cipher suite names only the AEAD algorithm and the hash used with HKDF. RFC 8446 moved authentication and key exchange out of the suite, so the old ECDHE_RSA style fields no longer appear. [1]
-
Often assumedA suite that starts with TLS_RSA_ is fine as long as it uses AES-GCM.
What the source saysRFC 8446 removed static RSA and Diffie-Hellman cipher suites from TLS 1.3 so that every public-key key exchange provides forward secrecy. Strong record encryption does not give a static RSA suite that property. [1]
-
Often assumedEnabling strong cipher suites makes it safe to keep TLS 1.0 and 1.1 switched on.
What the source saysRFC 8996 states that TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 MUST NOT be used and that implementations MUST NOT negotiate them, whatever cipher suites are on offer. [2]
- RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
- RFC 8996: Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1
Checked against these sources on .
Frequently asked questions
Does Recommended = Y mean my server is secure?
No. It is a property of one registry entry. It says nothing about which suites your server offers, their order, protocol versions, certificates, key sizes, session handling or software patch level.
Where do the OpenSSL names come from?
They are the names printed by openssl ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@SECLEVEL=0' on OpenSSL 3.6.4, joined to IANA rows by the two-byte value (see the OpenSSL ciphers manual). Suites OpenSSL does not implement can only be looked up by IANA name or hex. Other libraries (GnuTLS, NSS, Java) use their own names; paste the IANA name or hex for those.
Why is a suite I use not found?
Either it is spelled differently, it is a cipher-string keyword (HIGH, ALL, !aNULL), or it is not in the snapshot. Newer registry additions after 2026-09-18 are missing; check the live IANA table.
Can this test a live server?
No. It never connects to anything. To see what a server offers, run a scanner you control against it, then paste the suite list here to decode it.
What does a TLS cipher suite name mean?
It lists the algorithms for a connection. In TLS 1.2 a name such as TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 gives the key exchange (ECDHE), the authentication method (RSA), the bulk cipher and mode (AES-128-GCM) and the handshake hash (SHA-256). TLS 1.3 names only the cipher and hash.
Which TLS cipher suites does the IETF recommend for TLS 1.2?
RFC 9325 recommends four ECDHE suites with AES-GCM: ECDSA and RSA variants with AES-128-GCM-SHA256 and AES-256-GCM-SHA384. It also says implementations should not negotiate static RSA suites.
Why are CBC and static RSA suites flagged as legacy?
Static RSA suites (TLS_RSA_WITH_...) do not provide forward secrecy, so recorded traffic can be decrypted later if the server key leaks. CBC suites were involved in well-known attacks on TLS. Both are flagged as legacy here, which is a reading of the name rather than proof that a server is vulnerable.
Which cipher suites does TLS 1.3 use?
TLS 1.3 defines five: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256. The specification requires TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 to be implemented.
Sources
- IANA: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters, TLS Cipher Suites: suite names, values, DTLS-OK and Recommended columns (retrieved 2026-10).
- RFC 9846: TLS Protocol Version 1.3: the five TLS 1.3 suites and the mandatory-to-implement suite (retrieved 2026-10).
- RFC 9325: Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS: no TLS 1.0 or 1.1, recommended TLS 1.2 suites, static RSA advice (retrieved 2026-10).
What this check does and doesn’t tell you
This tool looks up pasted suites in a static copy of the IANA registry and reads the suite names. IANA “Recommended” is not a security audit of a server: it does not test configuration, protocol versions, certificates or patching. Registry values change, so confirm against the live IANA table before relying on a result. Nothing is fetched, stored or transmitted.